Africa: What are the consequences of the war in the Middle East on the growth of African countries? The International Monetary Fund speaks of an external shock of unprecedented magnitude since the Covid-19 pandemic.

The economic stabilization of Sub-Saharan Africa—the result of drastic monetary reforms, the elimination of fuel subsidies, and several years of fiscal austerity—has been hampered since February 28, 2026, by the war that erupted in the Middle East, leading to a surge in the prices of oil, fertilizers, and maritime freight.

In its April 2026 “Regional Economic Outlook,” the International Monetary Fund (IMF) describes an external shock of unprecedented magnitude since the Covid-19 pandemic. The institution now projects growth of 4.3% in 2026, a downward revision of 0.3 percentage points compared to its pre-pandemic forecast. The World Bank has set its own 2026 estimate at 4.1%, revised down from the 4.4% projected in October 2025, according to its “Africa Economic Update” report, published on April 8.

These figures may seem modest in isolation. Their real significance lies in the fact that they represent a break from the trend. In 2025, the region had grown by 4.5%—its fastest pace since 2014—according to IMF data. Median inflation had fallen from 4.8 percent at the end of 2024 to 3.4 percent at the end of 2025, driven by lower global food and energy prices, currency stabilization, and disciplined monetary policy. Nigeria had eliminated its fuel subsidies, Ethiopia and Ghana had restructured their sovereign debt, and Zambia had reached an agreement with its creditors after years of deadlock. Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, and Uganda were among the world’s fastest-growing economies, according to the IMF’s April report. For the first time in years, macroeconomic reform appeared to be producing measurable results.

“Countries actually have very little room to maneuver in this crisis because they simply don’t have much fiscal space,” said Andrew Dabalen, the World Bank’s chief economist for Africa, at a press briefing on April 8.

The war arrived precisely when this fiscal space was exhausted. Debt servicing for governments in sub-Saharan Africa has doubled, rising from 9 percent of government revenue in 2017 to around 18 percent in 2025, according to World Bank data. Principal repayments on external debt jumped from $37 billion in 2024 to $59.2 billion in 2025, the IMF reports, driven by the combined effect of maturing commercial loans and bond repayments. About half of the countries in the region were already classified as high risk of debt distress or in actual distress by the end of 2025, the IMF notes, with 22 of the 25 most exposed countries in the low-income category. For these governments, absorbing a new commodity shock through emergency spending is not a policy option—it is a fiscal impossibility.

The impact of the war is not uniform. Oil exporters—Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, and Congo—should benefit from increased oil revenues, at least in the short term. Net oil importers, who represent the majority of the region’s economies and its poorest populations, face deteriorating trade balances, higher energy import bills, increased fertilizer costs, and the resulting inflationary spillover. The region’s median inflation is projected to rise from 3.4% at the end of 2025 to 5.0% at the end of 2026, according to the IMF.

The World Bank has set its inflation estimate for 2026 at 4.8%. In a severe scenario—a prolonged conflict and a flight to quality in financial markets—regional production could fall by 0.6 percent compared to the pre-war trajectory, with oil importers experiencing a 1.5 percentage point contraction in their actual output in 2026 alone, according to IMF stress simulations.

The transmission extends beyond fuel prices alone. Gulf countries, which had committed over $100 billion in net foreign direct investment to sub-Saharan Africa in 2022 and 2023 alone, according to the World Bank, are reassessing their priorities. The region’s sovereign wealth funds had become among the most active investors in Africa’s energy sectors, among others goods and digital infrastructure.

This momentum is now uncertain. Remittances from migrants—a vital resource for countries like Comoros, Gambia, Lesotho, and Liberia—are under downward pressure as labor demand contracts in the construction and hospitality sectors in the Middle East. The IMF has estimated that a 20 percent rise in international food prices could push more than 20 million additional people in sub-Saharan Africa into moderate or severe food insecurity.

Government responses have been uneven and, in some cases, counterproductive. Kenya and Namibia have used their fuel stabilization funds to cushion prices at the pump; Ethiopia has introduced emergency fuel subsidies. Ghana, Malawi, Mali, and Tanzania have raised their regulated price ceilings. Somalia and Zimbabwe, with no room for intervention, have seen fuel prices skyrocket, notes the World Bank. The IMF has warned that widespread fuel subsidies—politically convenient—are regressive, disproportionately benefit affluent urban consumers, and become structurally difficult to remove once built into fiscal expectations.

The deeper question is whether the institutional gains of 2024 and 2025 will withstand a prolonged external shock. The stabilization of the Nigerian naira and reforms to the Ethiopian foreign exchange market were not abstract political victories—they garnered investor confidence, reduced borrowing costs, and contributed to the sovereign rating upgrades achieved by Ghana, South Africa, and Zambia in 2025. These upgrades are now under scrutiny. Sovereign spreads have widened across the region, particularly among fuel importers, according to IMF market data up to the end of March 2026.

The IMF has active programs in 27 of the region’s 45 countries and has indicated its readiness to support governments facing acute balance of payments pressures related to the conflict. The World Bank has reported it can mobilize up to $25 billion through its short-term crisis response instruments, and up to $70 billion within six months if the situation worsens, according to reports from the Spring Meetings currently underway in the United States, which run until April 17.

But economists at the Washington-based think tank, the Atlantic Council, have warned against further lending without a credible debt reduction roadmap, as this risks deepening the cycle rather than breaking it.

The next crucial signal will come from central banks. The IMF urged policymakers to resist any premature monetary easing—even in countries where inflation had receded—given the risk that currency depreciation and commodity price pass-through could reignite price pressures. For a region that has spent two years rebuilding its monetary credibility, this review could prove as crucial as the fiscal test.